William Schneider's article on the origin of the U.S. medical research grant program shines a spotlight on the Rockefeller Foundation's grant processes in the first half of the twentieth century and the National Institute of Health's model in the second half. Identifying both "direct and indirect influence" by the Rockefeller Foundation's earlier program and its leaders upon the conceptualization and implementation of NIH's much larger extramural research grant program post-WWII, Schneider, well armed, boldly ventures into the historically murky waters of "origin" that are destined to raise the eyebrows of any historian. Schneider, however, is also one of a number of recent medical history scholars who are tempering the popular historical tendency to see "government" as an outside force imposed on an identifiable and legitimate community, and rather considering it as another aspect of community itself. The communal processes within the larger scientific and medical community often prove far more interesting and enlightening than questions of pure causation and originality.
Historians, and medical historians in particular, spend a great deal of time considering institutional relationships and assessing institutional influences on the development of policies, practices, and products that characterize the state of medicine and public health in any given area or era. Modern medicine is so fraught with institutional influences and regulatory interventions, in fact, that identifying and assigning originality might seem, in many instances, to be a fool's errand. The search wonderfully focuses the mind, but the evidence often frustrates it in equal measure.
Scholars who take the time to delve deeply into the historical records of the federal government looking for clues as to the origins of ideas and policies will likely find few clear answers or even unequivocal evidence. Nevertheless, they will often find important clues indicating that many "communal" influences are far more influential than they might have expected or anticipated. An academic colleague recently asked me about the origins of a policy that he was trying to attribute to a particular FDA Commissioner, based on some original correspondence. Others, however, myself included, had credited a single official with the key concept based on "oral history" from his colleagues. By the end of a long discussion, the most convincing explanation proved to be one that would have been familiar to federal employees: the Commissioner listened to an agency expert, accepted his ideas as the basis for creating a workable policy, and then sent the expert as an "emissary" to medical "stakeholders" to explain and gain support for the new policy. FDA colleagues credited him with the "win," and he remained the expert on the policy long after the Commissioner who adopted it had left the agency.
It was too much to hope for, of course, that this scenario could have been corroborated in an oral history interview either with the Commissioner or with the agency expert after he retired. The term "institutional memory" is actually a misnomer. Most historians at federal institutions have to contend with multiple "institutional memories," which can be internally inconsistent and are often difficult to document. In general, the historical and evidential record becomes stronger the more interviews that are brought to bear on the same event or time period, but this is not always the case. Oral interviews can be frustratingly imprecise, laced with incorrect information on dates, places, or names, and riddled with errors both of commission and of omission. Early in my career, I learned a valuable lesson when I began to study an oral history interview conducted with a small group of retired FDA pharmacologists. The original interviewers had been engaged in studying the evolution of a particular lab testing protocol and they thought that a "group interview" would save them time, improve the accuracy of their research (since the participants would factually "cross check" each other), and still allow them to capture the contributions and perspectives of the individual scientists. Initially, it was judged to be a very good interview: the scientific pieces fit together seamlessly and the chronology seemed nearly flawless. Once the transcripts were sent out to the participants, however, another pharmacologist who had been absent for the interview, looked at the draft transcript and diagnosed his colleagues with a case of collective amnesia. In a scathing critique, he debunked almost every element of the group's collective chronology. More importantly, he had preserved internal records that clearly supported his own evolutionary recollections.
One key to understanding the federal government in a communal sense, as the examples above illustrate, is to appreciate that "expertise" is the currency of federal employment. It is valuable both internally and externally and usually increases in value the more it is traded. Specialized expertise, however, is often difficult to identify without access to primary source materials. Recently, in looking for evidence to explain why a particular group of federal "legal beagles" felt confident that they could "take on" and win a complicated, risky, and difficult legal case, I found references indicating that they had a formidable track record. After losing one round in court, an opposing counsel had been heard to quip that he now understood "how the Indians must have felt at a cowboy movie." This evidence was hardly conclusive, but it did prove footnote worthy.
One of the biggest research challenges for medical historians now and in the future is the fact that it is becoming increasingly uncommon for federal officials to preserve "personal papers" for historians to peruse. An excellent research paper, recently published, on the history of the federal role in the evolution of biomedical statistical science, in fact, was made possible only because NIH biostatistician Jerome Cornfield had corresponded extensively (and without benefit of electronic devices) with an academic colleague, Joel Greenhouse, during the 1960s. The whereabouts of the relevant NIH papers remain unknown but Greenhouse's papers were quite persuasive.
Schneider's study of the NIH prompts us to consider the need for more historical work on state agencies that neither estranges nor isolates its subject, acknowledging both community influence and governmental continuity. A balanced study of almost any issue in modern medical history will benefit from research into the interaction between federal agencies and a host of increasingly sophisticated and knowledgeable communities. But such work does not come easy. Every historian bears a responsibility for identifying and preserving historical sources, but federal historians, in particular, are in a unique position to act to preserve institutional records and data. In the age of the internet and social media, it is also becoming increasingly difficult to rely on traditional sources alone. As they become more alert to the ambiguities of the historical record, historians may find new opportunities to balance conventional textual sources with the memories and reflections of individual actors. Even within a federal workforce of 1.9 million, individual contributions and experiences are more important than one might expect. In addition, historical scholarship on the work of the government needs to be broadly inclusive, since patterns of scientific investigation, regulatory intervention, and governmental administration frequently extend across institutional divides. Historians of medicine should be inspired and encouraged to survey the work of the government with their usual gentle skepticism and care.
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